LCB Opinion Re 99-06
January 31, 2000
Senator Ann O'Connell
7225 Montecito Circle
Las Vegas, Nevada 89120-3118
Dear Senator O'Connell:
You have asked this office to address three questions relating
to the practice of homeopathy in this state. Your questions
arise from the interaction between Assembly Bill No. 286 of
the 1997 Legislature, which amended the scope of homeopathic
practice, the regulation adopted pursuant to that bill by the
Board of Homeopathic Medical Examiners, and the February 11,
1999, opinion of the Attorney General which declared that regulation
invalid. Specifically, you have asked (1) whether the Attorney
General's opinion invalidating the regulation is correct; (2)
whether the regulation is effective and valid, and if so, what
authority homeopathic physicians possess to prescribe medications,
including drugs, controlled substances and dangerous drugs;
and (3) whether the authority to write prescriptions granted
by this regulation is in conformity with the intent of the Legislature
in enacting A.B. 286. The complexity of these issues makes it
necessary to provide a significant amount of background information.
After providing this information, we will answer each of your
questions separately.
I. Background
A. Homeopathy in Nevada: 1983 to
1997
The licensed practice of homeopathy
in this state began in 1983 when the Legislature authorized
the practice and established the Board of Homeopathic Medical
Examiners (Homeopathic Board) to regulate and license the practice.
At that time, the Legislature defined homeopathy as a:
[S]ystem of medicine employing substances
of animal, vegetable, chemical or mineral origin [most of which
are g]iven in micro-dosage
and [p]repared according to
homeopathic pharmacology by which the formulation of homeopathic
preparations is accomplished by
dilution
and which
is] in accordance with the principle that a substance which
produces symptoms in a healthy person can eliminate those symptoms
in an ill person, resulting in the elimination and prevention
of illness utilizing classical methodology
(Section 5 of chapter 524, Statutes
of Nevada 1983, at page 1479.) To obtain a license as a homeopathic
physician, an applicant must have graduated from either a conventional,
that is, "allopathic," medical school or a school
osteopathy and must have been licensed to practice allopathic
or osteopathic medicine in some state, district, territory or
possession of the United States or in a foreign country. (NRS
630A.230.) In 1983, as at present, it was possible, although
not necessary, for a licensed homeopathic physician also to
be licensed to practice conventional allopathic or osteopathic
medicine. Thus, while every homeopathic physician must have
received training in allopathic or osteopathic medicine, each
homeopathic physician may choose whether to continue to practice
both forms of medicine, in which case he must be "dually-licensed,"
or to choose to practice homeopathy exclusively, in which case
he need only be "singly-licensed." The 1983 statute
did not clearly establish the scope of the authority to write
prescriptions that a license to practice homeopathic medicine
conferred on its holder. On the one hand, the statutory definition
had authorized homeopathic physicians to use "chemical"
substances. On the other hand, however, the existing statutory
scheme applicable to prescription medicines suggested that homeopathic
physicians lacked the authority to write prescriptions. It authorized
"physicians" to prescribe drugs, but defined that
term in a manner that excluded homeopathic physicians. (NRS
0.040 (1983.)) On January 7, 1985, the Attorney General issued
an "informal opinion" advising that a singly-licensed
homeopathic physician could not "prescribe, possess, dispense,
[or] administer controlled substances and dangerous drugs."
(1993 Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 131, September 20, 1993 (A.G.O. 93-21).)
Apparently, this informal opinion precipitated an amendment
of NRS 0.040 at the next session of the Legislature. (Id.) The
Legislature expanded the definition of "physician"
expressly to include homeopathic physicians wherever "physician"
was used in the NRS. (Section 5 of chapter 82, Statutes of Nevada
1985, at page 221.) This included those laws that conferred
the authority to write prescriptions for pharmaceutical medicines
or drugs generally, as well as for controlled substances and
dangerous drugs. (Chapters 639, 453 and 454 of NRS.) It is not
clear whether homeopathic physicians, or others, regarding this
statute as conferring carte blanche authority on homeopathic
physicians to prescribe allopathic drugs, but, at the next session
in 1987, the Legislature imposed an explicit limitation on the
authority of homeopathic physicians to write prescriptions.
The Legislature amended the definition of homeopathy to make
it plain that homeopathic physicians could only prescribe substances
"according to the medicines and dosages in the Homeopathic
Pharmacopoeia of the United States." (Section 10 of chapter
775, Statutes of Nevada 1987, at page 2056.)
In the fall of 1993, the Attorney
General was asked to provide an opinion on the then present
scope of homeopathic practice. Te Attorney General concluded
that part of the 1985 informal opinion had been overtaken by
circumstances and was no longer valid. She stated that "[i]t
is clear . . . that a homeopathic physician practicing homeopathically
[can] legally obtain, possess, and administer some dangerous
drugs and controlled substances for the manufacture of homeopathic
remedies." (1993 Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 131, September 20,
1993.) (Emphasis added) In other words, a physician, practicing
under his homeopathic license, could prescribe any medication,
including allopathic medicines, controlled substances, and dangerous
drugs, so long as it was found in the Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia
and providing that he prescribed it in the dosages also found
there. This might include the authority to prescribe many allopathic
drugs, but it almost certainly did not include the authority
to prescribe such drugs in allopathic doses. Rather, the Attorney
Gene3ral concluded that a homeopathic physician might write
a prescription for one pill of an allopathic drug if he did
so for the purpose of obtaining it to use in preparing a homeopathic
medicine in which the dose of the controlled substance actually
administered to the patient would be so diluted that it would
conform to homeopathic standards. This interpretation seems
to have been accepted by the homeopathic, allopathic and pharmaceutical
communities. It is sometimes referred to as the "one-pill
rule" and it covers the "micro-dosage" portion
of the authority of a homeopathic physician to write prescriptions.
The Attorney General also concluded that homeopathic physicians
possessed a limited power to prescribe administer certain substances
in "macro-dosages," but that these substances, called
"sarcodes," were unlikely to be a part of the stock
of conventional or allopathic drugs regularly stocked by pharmacists
in this state.
In the same 1993 opinion, however,
the Attorney General formally adopted one of the conclusions
endorsed by the earlier (1985) informal opinion. This was the
conclusion that a physician who is dually licensed as both a
homeopathic physician and as an allopathic (or osteopathic)
physician could not use the authority to write prescriptions
granted by his allopathic license to practice homeopathy. In
other words, "when a dually-licensed practitioner is practicing
allopathically or osteopathically, he can prescribe any dangerous
drug or controlled substance, but when he is practicing homeopathically,
he can only avail himself of the more narrow homeopathic pharmacopoeia
. . . "(1993 Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 131.) This restriction
on the scope of practice, in conjunction with the "one-pill
rule" (as modified by the exception for sarcodes), represents
the status quo ante. Together, they constitute the background
against which the subsequent legislation and regulation must
be viewed.
B. Assembly Bill No. 286 of the 1997
Legislature
In 1997, the Nevada Association
of Homeopathic Physicians offered a bill to expand the scope
of the licensed practice of homeopathy and to repeal the "one-pill
rule." The homeopathic community believed that since all
licensed homeopathic physicians had received allopathic (or
osteopathic) training and had satisfied, in some state or country,
the requirements to prescribe allopathic drugs in allopathic
doses, they should be allowed to do so in Nevada as well. Assembly
Bill No. 286 of the 1997 Legislature (A.B. 286), as introduced,
employed three statutory mechanisms to bring this about. First,
it eliminated the language in NRS 630A.040 that limited the
authority of homeopathic physicians to write prescriptions to
the substances and dosages found in the Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia.
Second, it increased the Homeopathic Board's power over licensing
to permit the Board to determine on a case-by-case basis, "which
allopathic pharmaceuticals and controlled substances, if any,
the homeopathic physician or advanced practitioner of homeopathy
may prescribe in conventional allopathic dosages." (Subsection
4 of section 1 of A.B. 286, as introduced). The Board was to
base its decisions on an evaluation of each licensee's pharmacological
expertise. Thus, if the Board was satisfied that an applicant
for homeopathic licensure was as qualified to prescribe allopathic
medicines in allopathic dosages as medical doctors licensed
by the Medical Board, the Homeopathic Board would confer on
him a license with equivalent authority. If it evaluated his
pharmaceutical knowledge less favorably, it would issue a license
that specified the particular allopathic drugs he was authorized
to prescribe, or it could grant him a license that expressly
disqualified him from prescribing conventional doses of any
allopathic drug. Third, A.B. 286 expanded the definition of
homeopathy to include the practice of "pharmaceutical medicine."
Although this term was never defined with precision, it appears
plain that it was intended to encompass the routine prescription
of allopathic drugs in allopathic doses. (See Testimony of Robert
F. Martin, Testimony of Michael J. Fischer, Hearing, Assembly
Committee on Commerce, March 31, 1997.) One of the witnesses
at the hearing before the Assembly Committee on Commerce provided
the following example of what the supporters of A.B. 286 hoped
to accomplish. Because relatively few states license homeopathic
medicine, the practice of homeopathic physicians in this state
includes the treatment of nonresidents who have traveled here
for the express purpose of taking a course of homeopathic treatment.
If, while undergoing this treatment, the patient manifested
a disease that was easily treatable with simple antibiotics,
for example, a strept throat, the supporters of A.B. 286 wished
singly-licensed homeopathic physicians to have sufficient authority
to write a prescription for the patient without having to refer
him to an allopathically-licensed physician to obtain the antibiotic.
(See Testimony of F. Fuller Royal, Testimony of Robert F. Martin,
Hearing, Assembly Committee on Commerce, March 31, 1997.)
Besides this expansion in the authority
to prescribe conventional allopathic medicines, the supporters
of A.B. 286 hoped to expand the scope of homeopathic practice
beyond its traditional or classical limits and to include what
one witness called "complex homeopathy," but which
might more accurately be described as a license for the practice
of specific forms of alternative medicine. (Testimony of Robert
F. Martin, Hearing, Assembly Committee on Commerce, March 31,
1997.) To accomplish this, the sponsors of A.B. 286 proposed
amending the definition of homeopathy to include, in addition
to the "non-invasive electrodiagnosis" that had formed
part of the 1983 definition, the following alternative practice
areas:
[C]ell therapy, neural therapy, herbal
therapy, neuromuscular integration, orthomolecular therapy,
nutrition, intravenous infusion, [and] chelation therapy . .
.
(See A.B. 286, as introduced). None
of these therapies fit within the traditional or "classical,"
non-statutory definition of homeopathy. The president of the
Homeopathic Board testified that "when [A.B. 286] talks
about neural therapy, you are not talking about homeopathy.
When it talks about orthomolecular therapy and herbalist medications,
you're not talking about homeopathy." (Testimony of F.
Fuller Royal, Minutes, Legislative Commission, December 18,
1998.) He also stated that there was "no such thing"
as homeopathic neuromuscular integration and that the purpose
of enumerating those additional therapies had been to "expand
the practice of homeopathy." (Testimony of F. Fuller Royal,
Minutes, Legislative Commission Meeting, June 26, 1998.) Consequently,
because none of these alternative therapies constituted part
of homeopathy as traditionally or classically conceived, A.B.
286 deliberately did not subject those therapies to the earlier
limitations imposed on classical homeopathy. Thus, the medications
that a homeopathic physician might prescribe under the therapies
need not be selected in conformity with the fundamental homeopathic
principle that a substance that would make a healthy person
ill would, if diluted correctly, make an ill person healthy.
Similarly, the authority of a homeopathic physician to write
a prescription, when practicing one of these alternative therapies,
was not limited to the substances or dosages that were found
in the Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia.
At the hearing on the bill before
the Assembly Committee on Commerce, both supporters and opponents
agreed that the net effect of all these provisions would be
to significantly expand the ability of singly-licensed homeopathic
physicians to practice allopathic medicine. Opponents of A.B.
286 objected to this expansion with an intensity that, apparently,
would have been sufficient to prevent the entire bill from emerging
from the Assembly Commerce Committee. Both the Chairman of that
committee and another member recall informing the lobbyist for
the homeopathic physicians that A.B. 286 would not pass unless
certain objectionable elements were removed. Both legislators
also recall that the lobbyist agreed to an amendment removing
them. (See Comments of Assemblyman Richard Perkins, Comments
of Assemblywoman Barbara E. Buckley, Minutes, Legislative Commission,
June 28 and December 18, 1998.)
A.B. 286, as amended, considerably
enhanced the power of the Homeopathic Board to regulate its
own practitioners, but did not contain the language that would
have authorized that board to "determine which allopathic
pharmaceuticals and controlled substances, if any, the homeopathic
physician . . . may prescribe in conventional allopathic dosages."
Similarly, while the Assembly Committee on Commerce had accepted
the Homeopathic Board's draft language establishing its right
to discipline its own members, the committee amended that provision
by adding an explicit declaration that if the conduct of a homeopathic
physician concerned a practice that was within the jurisdiction
of another licensing board, the Homeopathic Board was required
to forward the complaint to the appropriate board for action.
(See A.B. 286, First Reprint). Finally, the Committee edited
the list of proposed alternative therapies. As previously mentioned,
the Committee eliminated the general power to prescribe allopathic
drugs in allopathic doses by removing the phrase "pharmaceutical
medicine" from the list of alternative therapies. In its
initial consideration of amendments to the bill, the committee
retained the terms "intravenous infusion and chelation
therapy." (See Exhibit C, Attachment B, Minutes, Assembly
Committee on Commerce, May 5, 1997.) These two terms, however,
were also subsequently removed. (See Floor Minutes of the Assembly
Committee on Commerce, June 29, 1997, Assembly Journal, June
29, 1997, pp. 1777-78.)
With these changes in place, the
Medical Board and State Board of Pharmacy (Pharmacy Board) withdrew
their opposition to the legislation. The hearing on the amended
bill before the Senate Committee on Commerce and Labor was relatively
brief as there was no substantive opposition. One erstwhile
opponent testified that in its present form the bill was "innocuous."
(Testimony of Robert Barengo, Hearing, Senate Committee on Commerce
and Labor, July 3, 1997.) However, the chairman of that committee
recalls being informed that the terms "chelation therapy,"
"intravenous infusion," and pharmaceutical medicine"
had been removed solely to eliminate redundancy or surplus language.
He understood that it was agreed by all parties that those therapies
were authorized by virtue of the remaining terms. For that reason
alone, he recalls, the Senate committee did not conduct full
hearings on the bill. (See Comments of Senator Randolph J. Townsend,
Minutes, Legislative Commission, June 26, 1998; see also Comments
of Senator Mark James, Minutes, Legislative Commission, December
18, 1998.)
Despite what now appears as an obvious
difference in understanding between certain members of the Senate
with some of their colleagues in the Assembly, there is nothing
to suggest that members of either house were aware of these
differences when they voted unanimously in favor of the amended
bill. Although the new alternative therapies were each listed
in the bill, they were not defined. Consequently, the Homeopathic
Board attempted to supply these definitions by regulation.
C. The Regulation and the Legislative
Commission
The Homeopathic Board adopted its
first set of proposed definitions on May 5, 1998, after conducting
the required workshop0s and public hearings. The Legal Division
of the Legislative Counsel Bureau assigned the proposed regulation
the file number R213-97. The Medical and Pharmacy Boards participated
in the hearings and, therefore, had early notice of the proposed
definitions. The bulk of the definitions excited no controversy,
but the representatives of the allopathic community insisted
that in its definitions of two of the alternative therapies---orthomolecular
medicine and neural therapy---the Homeopathic Board had exceeded
its statutory authority. As originally submitted, the regulation
defined "orthomolecular medicine" to include "[t]he
prescription of . . . pharmaceutical medicines, [and] the intravenous
infusion of various substances, including . . . pharmaceutical
medications [and] chelating agents . . ." The regulation
also defined "neural medicine" to mean the "injection
of local anesthetics . . . medicinal or pharmaceutical substances
. . ." The allopathic physicians objected that the definitions
purported to permit homeopathic physicians to prescribe pharmaceutical
"medicines," "medications," and "substances"
when the authorization to practice "pharmaceutical medicine"
had been expressly removed by the Assembly Committee on Commerce.
The same objection applied to the term "intravenous infusion"
and the practice of chelation.
The Legal Division of the Legislative
Counsel Bureau notified the Homeopathic Board of these objections,
but the Homeopathic Board chose not to revise its regulation
at that time. Consequently, when R213-97 was submitted to the
Legislative Commission for approval at its June 26, 1998, meeting,
representatives of the Homeopathic and Medical boards were on
hand to present their arguments to the Commission. Under NRS
233B.067, the Commission has the authority to object to a regulation
on two bases:
1. The regulation does not conform
to statutory authority; or
2. The regulation does not carry out legislative intent.
The Commission heard extensive testimony
and considered the matter at length. The majority of the testimony
turned on the enhanced authority of homeopathic physicians to
write prescriptions that were perceived to be found in the references
to "pharmaceutical medicines," "pharmaceutical
medications" and "pharmaceutical substances"
in light of the Assembly amendment's removal of the term "pharmaceutical
medicine" from A.B. 286. In particular, opponents objected---as
they had at the hearing before the Assembly Committee on Commerce---to
any expansion in the power of singly-licensed homeopathic physicians
to prescribe allopathic dosages of controlled substances, including
narcotics, and dangerous drugs. The Commission concluded that,
assuming that the definitions selected by the Homeopathic Board
and incorporated into the regulation were in accordance with
authoritative sources in the field of alternative medicine,
the regulation was within that board's statutory grant of authority.
Nevertheless, the Commission voted to object to the regulation
on the ground that the increased authority it conferred on homeopathic
physicians to prescribe allopathic drugs in allopathic doses
violated the legislative intent behind A.B. 286. (See Minutes,
Legislative Commission Meeting, June 26, 1998.) Accordingly,
the Director of the Legislative Counsel Bureau returned the
regulation to the Homeopathic Board with a note of the Commission's
objections. (See letter from Lorne J. Malkiewich to F. Fuller
Royal, June 30, 1998.)
In accordance with the procedures
set forth in NRS 233B.0675, the Homeopathic Board revised R213-97.
The revised regulation replaced the terms "pharmaceutical
medicines," "pharmaceutical medications," and
"pharmaceutical substances," with a single term, "pharmaceutical
preparations." This term was then expressly limited to
make plain that it did "not include narcotic drugs or opiates
that are listed as schedule II controlled substances pursuant
to chapter 453 of NRS, except as those substances may be described
for use in the official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United
States."
The revised regulation was resubmitted
to the Legislative Commission for review at its December 18,
1998, meeting. Once again, the Commission heard extended testimony
both for and against the regulation. The witness for the Homeopathic
Board contended that inasmuch as the primary objection to the
earlier regulation had been the expansion in the authority of
homeopathic physicians to prescribe narcotics or other controlled
substances in allopathic doses, the revised regulation eliminated
that objection. In effect, it restated the "one-pill rule"
as it applied to the substances. The Medical and Pharmacy Boards,
however, continued to object to the regulation. While conceding
that the revised version limited prescriptions by homeopathic
physicians of certain schedule II controlled substances (opiates
and other narcotics), the Boards contended that it conferred
carte blanche authority on homeopathic physicians to prescribe,
in allopathic doses, all other allopathic drugs, all controlled
substances except the narcotics and opiates listed in schedule
II, and all dangerous drugs. In particular, they objected that
the revised regulation authorized homeopathic physicians to
prescribe allopathic doses, certain enumerated chelating agents
and to administer them by means of "intravenous infusion."
Operating on the assumption that these substances would be prescribed
in the course of administering chelation therapy, a practice
expressly authorized by the regulation's definition of orthomolecular
therapy, the revised R213-07 permitted, by regulation, two practices---chelation
and intravenous infusion---that had been expressly denied to
homeopathic physicians by the Assembly amendments to A.B. 286.
Following this evidence and after
full discussion, the Legislative Commission by a close vote
failed to object to the revised regulation and it therefore
became effective. Under NRS 233B.067 and 233B.0675, unless a
majority of the Commission objects to a regulation, the Director
of the Legislative Counsel Bureau is obliged to file the regulation
with the Secretary of State and it becomes effective as of the
date of filing. This was, accordingly, done and the regulation
became effective on December 18, 1998. (See letter from Lorne
J. Malkiewich to Dean Heller, December 18, 1998.)
D. The Attorney General Declares
the Regulation Invalid
The 1999 session of the Legislature
convened on February 2. Although numerous members of the Legislative
Commission had indicated that the scope of the practice of homeopathy
would be addressed at the session, in fact, no such legislation
was passed or even requested. The Pharmacy Board, however, solicited
the opinion of the Attorney General on the question of whether
a singly-licensed homeopathic physician administering the alternative
or non-traditional therapies described in the adopted regulation
could prescribe controlled substances or dangerous drugs. The
Attorney General responded on February 11, 1999. (See Nev. Op.
Att'y Gen. 99-06 (A.G.O. 99-06).)
After a brief recapitulation of
the amendment and passage of A.B. 286 of the 1997 Legislature
and evolution of R213-97, the Attorney General concluded that
the regulation was invalid. The Attorney General reached this
conclusion because, during a Legislative Commission hearing,
members of the Homeopathic Board had, in her opinion, expressed
"an intent to interpret the phrase 'pharmaceutical preparations'
as permitting a singly licensed homeopathic physician to prescribe
some controlled substances and dangerous drugs . . . We believe
this interpretation renders the regulation invalid . . ."
The Attorney General also concluded that:
When the Legislature specifically
deleted the term 'pharmaceutical medicine' from the definition
of homeopathy, its clear intent in enacting the remainder of
A.B. 286 was to prohibit singly licensed homeopathic physicians
from having the ability to prescribe controlled substances and
dangerous drugs in the same manner as an allopathic physician
We believe that our conclusion in Op. Nev. Att'y Gen.
No. 93-21 (September 20, 1993), continues to accurately describe
the limited ability of singly licensed homeopathic physicians
to posses, dispense, and administer controlled substances and
dangerous drugs.
Unlike the 1985 "informal"
opinion, this opinion was issued publicly and was made public
during the course of the Legislative session. Nevertheless,
the Legislature took no further action and no further inquiries
were made until you requested this opinion following the conclusion
of the session.
II. Analysis
With the preceding background in
place, we will now analyze each of your questions separately.
Your first question is whether the Attorney General's opinion
is correct. It is the opinion of this office that it is not.
A. The Attorney General's Opinion
No. 99-06
As a preliminary matter, we note
that the "opinions of the attorney general do not constitute
binding legal authority or precedent." Goldman v. Bryan,
106 Nev. 30, 42 (1990). "The opinion of the state attorney
general is advisory and not a binding interpretation of state
law." Nevada Highway Patrol Ass'n v. State, F.2d 1549,
1554, n.6 (1990). See also Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v.
McKay, 769 F.2d 534, 539 (9th Cir. 1985); Weston v. County of
Lincoln, 98 Nev. 183 (1982); and Cannon v. Taylor, 88 Nev. 89
(1972). Consequently, even if A.G.O. 99-06 were correct, it
would not be binding. In any event, however, the Attorney General
possesses neither the statutory nor the constitutional power
to invalidate regulations. Therefore, it is the opinion of this
office the A.G.O. 99-06 is necessarily incorrect to the extent
that it purports to claim that the Attorney General has the
authority to invalidate a regulation after the regulation has
been adopted in compliance with all the procedures required
under chapter 233B of NRS and has been filed with the Secretary
of State.
Section 2 of Article 3 of the Nevada
Commission expressly provides for legislative review and nullification
of administrative regulations. It states that:
If the legislature authorizes the
adoption of regulations by an executive agency which binds persons
outside the agency, the legislature may provide by law for:
(a) The review of these regulations by a legislative agency
before their effective date to determine initially whether each
is within the statutory authority for its adoption;
(b) The suspension by a legislative agency of any such regulation
which appears to exceed that authority, until it is reviewed
by a legislative body composed of members of the Senate and
Assembly which is authorized to act on behalf of both houses
of the legislature; and
(c) The nullification of any such regulation by a majority vote
of that legislative body, whether or not the regulation was
suspended.
Acting pursuant to this constitutional
grant of authority, the Legislature has amended chapter 233B
of NRS, the Nevada Administrative Procedure Act. In chapter
233B of NRS, the Legislature provided, inter alia, the exclusive
avenues for determining the pre-enforcement validity of a regulation.
Under NRS 233B.110, "[t]he validity or applicability of
any regulation may be determined in a proceeding for a declaratory
judgment in the district court" by any plaintiff who alleges
that "the regulation, or its proposed application, interferes
with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair [his]
legal rights or privileges . . " Alternatively, "[a]n
agency may institute an action for declaratory judgment to establish
the validity of any one or more of its own regulations."
In this proceeding, "[t]he court shall declare the regulation
invalid if it finds that it violates constitutional or statutory
provisions or exceeds the statutory authority of the agency."
A.G.O. 99-06 concluded that a regulation is invalid if it "exceeds
the statutory authority delegated by the Legislature to an administrative
agency." This is clearly correct, but as NRS 233B.110 makes
clear, when the regulation exceeds its authority, it is the
court, not the Attorney General, that is required to "declare
the regulation invalid." Chapter 233B of NRS expressly
provides a role for the Attorney General in all actions to determine
the validity of a regulation. The plaintiff in any such action
is required to serve a copy of the complaint upon the Attorney
General, who is "entitled to be heard." (Subsection
3 of NRS 233B.110.)
The statutory scheme embodied in
chapter 233B of NRS assigns distinct functions to the judicial
branch of government and to the Attorney General. It limits
the Attorney General's role to "being heard" by the
court. This assignment and limitation points up another objection
to the Attorney General's assertion of the authority to declare
administrative regulations invalid, which is the constitutional
objection inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers.
Section 1 of Article 3 of the Nevada Constitution states that:
The powers of the Government of the
State of Nevada Shall be divided into three separate departments,---the
Legislative,---the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one
of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining
to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed
or permitted in this constitution.
The remainder of Article 3 confers
on the Legislature the authority to nullify administrative regulations
before they become effective. Similarly, the power to interpret
statutes and regulations and to declare them invalid is entrusted
to the courts in implicit reliance on the constitutional principle
that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.).
For the Attorney General to assert a power to invalidate regulations
clearly violates the doctrine of the separation of powers by
exercising functions appertaining to both of the other branches
of government.
The Attorney General is obviously
aware of her constitutional role and it is unlikely that she
intended to exceed it. Rather, it is probable that her declaration
of the invalidity of R213-97 contained in A.G.O. 99-06 merely
represents her prediction of what a court of competent jurisdiction
would be likely to declare if the question were posed to the
court. Alternatively, the opinion could be meant to communicate
the legal argument against the regulation's validity that the
Attorney General would make in an action at law brought to determine
that question. However, even regarded in this light, A.G.O.
99-06 is flawed in several particulars that make it unlikely
to be a fully reliable guide to future judicial conduct on this
issue.
First, A.G.O. 99-06 states that
a "regulation cannot restore a power that the Legislature
specifically took out of a piece of legislation." This
principle is sound, but it does not apply to this case in the
manner suggested by the Attorney General. The power specifically
taken out of A.B. 286 by the Legislature---expansion of the
definition of homeopathy to include the unlimited practice of
"pharmaceutical medicine," i.e., complete authority
to prescribe allopathic drugs in allopathic doses---is not the
same as the authority granted by the regulation. This latter
authority consists only of a limited power to prescribe or use
certain "pharmaceutical preparations" in certain alternative
therapies. Because these two grants of power are not identical,
the regulation does not "restore" a power specifically
removed from the legislation.
Moreover, A.G.O. 99-06 is internally
inconsistent. The opinion declares that the regulation is invalid
because it could be interpreted "as permitting a singly
licensed homeopathic physician to prescribe some controlled
substances and dangerous drugs." Nevertheless, A.G.O. 99-06
concludes by reaffirming A.G.O. 93-21 which declared that "[I]t
is clear . . . that a homeopathic physician practicing homeopathically
could legally obtain, possess, and administer some dangerous
drugs and controlled substances for the manufacture of homeopathic
remedies. Additionally, a homeopathic physician may also prescribe
those dangerous drugs and controlled substances allowed by NRS
630A.040." Besides this obvious contradiction, A.G.O. 99-06
commits the non sequitur of concluding that an interpretation
of the regulation that would permit singly-licensed homeopathic
physicians to prescribe "some" controlled substances
and dangerous drugs renders the regulation invalid because the
Legislature clearly intended to prohibit singly-licensed homeopathic
physicians from having the unlimited ability to prescribe any
and all controlled substances and dangerous drugs "in the
same manner as an allopathic physician."
In addition, A.G.O. 99-06 is, simultaneously,
underinclusive as well as overbroad. It limits its consideration
to the effect of the legislative deletion of the power to practice
"pharmaceutical medicine" from A.B. 286. However,
as previously noted, the Assembly Committee on Commerce also
eliminated "chelation therapy" and "intravenous
infusion" from A.B. 286. Moreover, A.B. 286 expanded the
regulatory power of the Homeopathic Board over its licensees,
but specifically rejected language that would have given that
board the power to grant licenses to prescribe allopathic drugs.
Finally, the bill expanded the scope of the practice of homeopathy
to encompass seven alternative therapies, some of which require
the administration of medicinal substances of one kind or another.
The authority of licensed homeopathic physicians to write prescriptions
under A.B. 286 and R213-97 cannot be adequately evaluated if
all the powers granted and refused are not taken into consideration.
On the other hand, A.G.O. 99-06 declares R213-97 invalid in
its entirety, eliminating the authority of homeopathic physicians
to practice noninvasive electrodiagnosis, cell therapy, herbal
therapy, neuromuscular integration and nutrition, when these
practices are expressly authorized by A.B. 286, and no opposition
of any kind has been raised with respect to these therapies.
Finally, the Attorney General's
invalidation of the regulation is premature A.G.O. 99-06 is
not premised on a claim that the language of the regulation
necessarily conflicts with its authorizing statute. Instead,
A.G.O. 99-06 concludes that a particular "interpretation
makes the regulation invalid." However, the Homeopathic
Board has not in fact, issued any such interpretation. A.G.O.
99-06 rests on the Attorney General's perception that "Board
members [of the Homeopathic Board] clarified in the Legislative
Commission an intention to interpret the phrase 'pharmaceutical
preparations' as permitting a singly licensed homeopathic physician
to prescribe some controlled substances and dangerous drugs
. . ." Even if that were a valid basis for invalidating
the regulation, which, as previously discussed, it is not, there
were never more than two of the Homeopathic Board's five members
present at either meeting of the Legislative Commission. * Assuming
that the Attorney General correctly perceived the intended interpretation
of those two members, only one of them spoke, they do not constitute
a majority of the Board. Consequently, this seems a slender
basis on which to invalidate even the portion of the regulation
that could be subject to that hypothetical interpretation. When
employed to invalidate all the other aspects of the regulation,
even this tenuous basis of rationality is lost. Therefore, the
Attorney General cannot declare the regulation invalid on the
basis of a belief that the Homeopathic Board might at some future
time choose to interpret its regulation in an offensive manner.
A.G.O. 99-06, does, however, achieve
one valuable insight. It concludes that in enacting A.B. 286,
the Legislature evidenced the clear intent that homeopathic
physicians were not to enjoy the same unlimited authority to
prescribe allopathic drugs in allopathic doses that is possessed
by allopathic or osteopathic physicians. This insight, however,
requires further evaluation. A.G.O. 99-06 states that "[w]hen
the Legislature specifically deleted the term 'pharmaceutical
medicine' from the definition of homeopathy, its clear intent
in enacting the remainder of A.B. 286 was to prohibit the singly
licensed homeopathic physician from having the ability to prescribe
controlled substances and dangerous drugs in the same manner
as an allopathic physician." As previously pointed out,
the correct from of reference for determining legislative intent
should be the act taken as a whole, including parts adopted,
as well as all of the powers eliminated, during the amendment
process. It is the opinion of this office that a more accurate
way of characterizing the legislative intent behind A.B. 286
is that the Legislature, even while significantly expanding
the authority of homeopathic physicians to practice alternative
medicine and while enlarging the autonomy of the profession
to regulate itself, ultimately refused to alter the status quo
that declares that a license to practice homeopathic medicine
does not confer the authority to prescribe allopathic drugs
in allopathic doses in the same manner as an allopathic physician.
We will return to this discussion of the correct determination
of legislative intent in our response to your third question.
Before doing so, however, we turn to your second question. Is
the regulation effective, is it valid, and if so, what authority
at present do homeopathic physicians have to prescribe allopathic
medications, including controlled substances and dangerous drugs?
B. Effectiveness, validity and resulting
authority of R213-97
1. Effectiveness
It is the opinion of this office
that the regulation R213-97 is currently effective. The statutory
scheme of chapter 233B of NRS is unambiguous in this regard.
A permanent regulation becomes effective as of the date the
Legislative Counsel files it with the Secretary of State, unless
a later date is specified in the regulation. (NRS 233B.070.)
The Legislative Counsel has a non-discretionary duty to file
such regulations once certain procedural requirements were fulfilled.
In this instance, all the statutory procedural requirements
were satisfied. The Legislative Commission failed to object
to the regulation before it was filed with the Secretary of
State and it may not do so now. By the same token, the 1999
Legislature could only have nullified the regulation if the
Legislative Commission had voted to suspend the filing of the
regulation. (NRS 233B.0675.) The Legislative Commission's failure
to object deprived the full Legislature of its opportunity to
nullify the regulation directly. In the absence of a constitutional
amendment or new legislation, the regulation is beyond the reach
of the legislative branch. Accordingly, it is the opinion of
this office that, pursuant to NRS 233B.0675, the regulation
became effective on December 18, 1998, and until a court of
competent jurisdiction enjoins its enforcement or declares it
invalid or the Homeopathic Board adopts an amendment, it remains
in effect and has the force of law. (See NRS 233B.040.) This
brings us to the second part of your question, is the regulation
valid?
2. Validity
Like a statute, an effective regulation
must be presumed to be valid until a court of competent jurisdiction
determines that it is not. (1A Sutherland Statutory Construction,
§31.02 (5th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1999); see also Immigration
and Naturalization Ser4vice v. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2784
(1983).) Therefore, presuming, as we must, that R213-97 is valid,
this brings us to the third part of your question. Under the
statutes and regulations currently in effect, what authority
does a homeopathic physician have to possess, administer, dispense
or prescribe allopathic drugs, controlled substances and dangerous
drugs?
3. The authority to write prescriptions
As a preliminary matter, we note
that a dually-licensed homeopathic physician has the authority
to write prescriptions, including prescriptions for allopathic
drugs in allopathic doses, that he enjoys under his allopathic
(or osteopathic) license. However, it remains the opinion of
this office, as we advised you in 1998, that the powers and
accountability of dually-licensed homeopathic physicians can
only be determined with reference to the capacity in which they
are practicing at any given time. (See letter from Brenda J.
Erdoes and Eileen O'Grady to Senator Ann O'Connell, March 19,
1998.) A licensed homeopathic physician, when practicing homeopathically,
is not accountable to the Medical Board because he is not exercising
any of the rights or privileges conferred by virtue of an allopathic
license issued by that Board. This conclusion, although in conflict
with Attorney General's Opinion No. 98-01, is in complete accord
with her earlier A.G.O. 93-21. So, we do not believe that there
is any difference between the authority of singly- and dually-licensed
homeopathic physicians to write prescriptions when they are
practicing homeopathically. The definitions of R213-97 concern
only the nontraditional, alternative therapies recently incorporated
into homeopathic medicine by virtue of A.B. 286. Nothing in
that regulation changes, or purports to change, any aspect of
traditional practice. Consequently, it is the opinion of this
office that a homeopathic physician, practicing traditionally,
does so with the same authority and under the same limitations
that he has since 1987. The limits of this practice are fully
and competently set out in the Attorney General's Opinion No.
93-21. Having said this, it must be remembered that A.B. 286
bifurcated the practice of homeopathy into what we have called
"traditional" or "classical" homeopathy
and "complex homeopathy" or, more accurately, certain
"alternative therapies." These practices consist of
"[n]oninvasive electrodiagnosis, cell therapy, neural therapy,
herbal therapy, neuromuscular integration, orthomolecular therapy
and nutrition" as these practices have been defined in
R213-97. As with the earlier distinction between allopathic
and homeopathic licenses, we believe that it is possible to
determine the authority of a homeopathic physician to write
prescriptions only after determining which homeopathic therapies---"tradition"
or "alternative"---he is engaged in.
(a) Traditional
Little additional needs to be said
about the authority of a homeopathic physician to write prescriptions
when practicing traditional or classical homeopathy. The limits
of this power are contained in NRS 0.040 and chapters 453, 454,
and 639 of NRS, as well as in NRS 630A.040. As we previously
indicated, it is the opinion of this office that A.G.O. 93-21
accurately interpreted the statute, the operative portion of
which has not been amended in a way that significantly alters
this conclusion. Thus, homeopathic physicians may prescribe,
dispense and administer traditional homeopathic remedies as
medically appropriate according to the standards applicable
to the homeopathic tradition. With respect to allopathic medications,
including controlled substances or dangerous drugs, homeopathic
physicians may write prescriptions for a single pill of such
substances, but only for the purpose of diluting it and compounding
it into a homeopathic preparation, only if the allopathic drug
is found in the Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia and only if the resulting
diluted dosage is in accordance with dosages found in that pharmacopoeia.
(b) Alternative therapies
Homeopathic physicians, when practicing
one of the alternative therapies authorized by A.B. 286 and
defined in R213-97, have some additional authority to write
prescriptions for allopathic drugs. It should be re-emphasized,
however, that we believe this power to be practice-specific.
For example, in the hearing on A.B. 286, the representatives
of the homeopathic physicians expressed a desire to be able
to prescribe antibiotics to patients suffering from Strept throat.
A homeopathic physician who desires to prescribe antibiotics,
that is, allopathic drugs in allopathic doses according to allopathic
principles, is not practicing classical homeopathy. Neither,
as far as we can tell from the definitions contained in R213-97,
is he practicing one of the alternative therapies. Consequently,
nothing in the statute or regulation confers any increased authority
to prescribe antibiotics. A homeopathic physician with an allopathic
or osteopathic license may prescribe antibiotics under these
circumstances, but when he does so, he is practicing under his
medical license, his authority to write prescriptions is determined
by that license, and he is accountable to the Medical, not the
Homeopathic Board for any complaints arising from that treatment.
A singly-licensed homeopathic physician did not have the authority
to prescribe antibiotics in these circumstances before the passage
of A.B. 286 and the adoption of R213-97. Such a physician has
not gained any power to do so under either measure. Therefore,
a homeopathic physician, by virtue of his homeopathic license,
does not have a general or unlimited power to practice allopathic
medicine, including the prescription of allopathic drugs in
allopathic doses. However, when practicing a legislatively sanctioned
alternative therapy, it is the opinion of this office that a
homeopathic physician, so long as he complies with all state
and federal laws and regulations applicable to prescription
drugs, may prescribe in allopathic doses:
1. Any Controlled substance listed
in schedule I, II, III, IV or V as set forth in chapter 453
or NRS, so long as both administration and dosage are medically
appropriate according to the standards applicable to that alternative
therapy, except that a homeopathic physician may not prescribe
"narcotic drugs and opiates that are listed as schedule
II controlled substances pursuant to chapter 453 of NRS, except
as those substances may be described for use in the official
Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States." (R213-97.)
2. Any dangerous drug that is defined
in chapter 454 of NRS so long as both administration and dosage
are medically appropriate according to the standards applicable
to that alternative therapy.
3. Any other allopathic drug available
by prescription so long as both administration and dosage are
medically appropriate according to the standards applicable
to that alternative therapy.
Finally, this brings us to your third
question, is the authority to write prescriptions
granted by R213-97 in conformity with the intent of the Legislature
in enacting A.B. 286?
C. Legislative intent
We believe that the best way of
addressing the question of whether R213-97 conforms to legislative
intent is to examine how a court would be likely to rule if
this regulation were challenged in a legal action, whether brought
as an action for a declaratory judgment, a suit for a writ of
mandamus or an action for damages. According to NRS 233B.110,
a court in such a position "shall declare the regulation
invalid if it finds that [the regulation] violates constitutional
or statutory provisions or exceeds the statutory authority of
the agency."
Courts determining whether a particular
regulation is beyond the power granted to an administrative
agency, "must not only interpret the statute to determine
the powers conferred but also the regulation to determine whether
its provisions comply with the statute." 1A Sutherland
Statutory Construction, §31.06. In doing so, judges apply
standard principles and rules of statutory construction, as
well as special rules applicable to regulations only. 1A Sutherland
Statutory Construction, §31.06. These rules, however, are
not absolutes and do not permit us to predict with certainty
what outcome any particular judge might reach. Consequently,
we will present first the considerations that militate in favor
of the regulation's validity. We will then present the countervailing
considerations and, finally, our opinion as to which outcome
is the more likely.
1. Arguments in favor of validity
The first applicable principle on
rule of statutory construction accords to regulations the same
presumption in favor of their validity that applies to statutes.
1A Sutherland Statutory Construction, §31.02. A corollary
of this presumption is that the party challenging the validity
of the regulation bears the burden of proving its invalidity.
Any interpretation of the regulation must take place against
the backdrop of these presumptions favoring the validity of
the regulation.
In addition, the rules of statutory
construction provide that "[w]hen presented with a question
of statutory interpretation, the intent of the legislature is
the controlling factor and, if the statute under consideration
is clear on its face, a court cannot go beyond the statute in
determining legislative intent. If, however, the statute is
ambiguous, it can be construed "in line with what reason
and public policy would indicate the legislature intended .
. .'" Robert E. v. Justice Court of Reno Township, 99 Nev.
443, 445, 664 P.2d 957, 959 (1983) (internal citation omitted).
Moreover, the court may also examine the legislative history
of a provision if doing so would be "useful" in determining
legislative intent. Del Papa v. Board of Regents of the University
and Community College System of Nevada, 114 Nev. Adv. Op. 50,
at p. 5, 956 P.2d 770 (1998). "A statute or portion thereof
is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably
well-informed persons in either of two or more senses."
Robert E. v. Justice Court, 99 Nev. at 445, 664 P.2d at 959
(internal citation omitted); see also McKay v. Board of Supervisors,
102 Nev. 644, 649, 730 P.2d 438, 442 (1987).
It can be argued that A.B. 286 is
ambiguous as many of the terms used in the bill are capable
of being understood in two or more senses. For example, as previously
mentioned, none of the alternative therapies added to the definition
of homeopathy would be considered "homeopathic" as
that term has been traditionally used. Thus, the chief witness
in favor of expanding the definition of homeopathy to include
these alternative therapies testified that "when [A.B.
286 talks about neural therapy, you are not talking about homeopathy.
When it talks about orthomolecular therapy and herbalist medications,
you're not talking about homeopathy." He also stated that
there was "no such thing" as homeopathic neuromuscular
integration. (Testimony of F. Fuller Royal, Minutes, Legislative
Commission, December 18, and June 26, 1998.) Besides this inherent
ambiguity, a particular ambiguity attaches to the most controversial
of the contested terms, "orthomolecular therapy."
This term has a definition in conventional medical dictionaries
that does not correspond in every particular with the manner
in which that therapy is conducted by the alternative medical
community. (See Testimony of Robert Barengo, Minutes, Legislative
Commission, June 28, 1998.) However, Dr. Royal testified, and
it was conceded, that the definitions of these alternative therapies
adopted in the regulations employed correctly the meaning of
these practices bear in the sources regarded as authoritative
by the alternative medicine community. (See Testimony of F.
Fuller Royal, Minutes, Legislative Commission, June 28 and December
18, 1998; Testimony of Robert Barengo, Minutes, Legislative
Commission, June 28, 1998.) In light of these ambiguities, a
court would not be able to rely solely on the language of the
statute to determine the Legislative intent behind A.B. 286
as a predicate to determining whether R213-97 conforms with
that intent. Instead, the court would be fully justified in
examining all the extrinsic sources available, including the
legislative history of A.B. 286, to attempt to discern the intent
of the Legislature.
Moreover, when doubt arises as to
the proper interpretation of a statute affecting an administrative
agency, the Nevada Supreme Court has found that the interpretation
of the agency that is charged with the administration and enforcement
of the statute is persuasive evidence of its meaning. Nev. Power
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 102 Nev. 1, 4 (1986); see also Dep't
of Human Resources v. UHS of the Colony Inc., 103 Nev. 208,
211 (1987) (stating that an administrative construction that
is within the language of the statute will not readily be disturbed
by the courts); Roberts v. State, 104 Nev. 33, 39, 752 P.2d
221, 225, (1988). The theory behind this interpretation is that
the Legislature is charged with having knowledge of the manner
in which the statutes it enacts are carried out. Where the legislature
"has had ample time to amend an administrative agency's
reasonable interpretation of a statute, but fails to do so,
such acquiescence indicates the interpretation is consistent
with legislative intent." Hughes Properties v. State of
Nevada, 100 Nev. 295, 298, 680 P.2d 970, 972 (1984) (citation
omitted). "[N]early contemporaneous constructions of state
statutes by administrative agencies charged with their implementation
are entitled to great weight, especially when, as in the present
case, the legislature fails to repudiate the agency's construction."
Roberts v. State, 104 Nev. at 39, 752 P.2d at 225 (citations
omitted). This citation is particularly applicable inasmuch
as the final decision of the Legislative Commission failing
to object to the regulation took place less than 6 weeks before
the opening of the next session of the legislature. Numerous
members of the Legislative Commission had suggested during their
discussions that the matter be referred to the Legislature.
However, the fact that the Legislature not only did not pass,
but did not even request, a bill to modify the scope of the
practice of homeopathy may well justify a conclusion that the
Legislature did not believe that the regulation violated its
intent in amending chapter 630A of NRS. And "[a]lthough
not controlling, the legislature's construction of its own act
is persuasive in ascertaining the act's meaning." Roberts,
104 Nev. at 40, 752 P.2d at 225.
Standard rules of statutory construction
direct that statutes should be read and interpreted as a whole.
2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.05; K.J.B., Inc.
v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 103 Nev. 473, 476 (1987). "'Courts
must construe statutes. . . to give meaning to all of their
parts and language . . . The court should read each sentence,
phrase, and word to render it meaningful within the context
of the purpose of the legislation.'" Del Papa v. Reagents,
114 Nev. Adv. Op. 50, at p. 3, quoting Board of County Comm'rs
v. CMC of Nevada, 99 Nev. 739, 744, 670 P.2d 102, 105 (1983)
(citations omitted). Taken as a whole, it seems clear that the
intent of the Legislature was to expand the scope of homeopathic
practice, but not to increase it so far that it became an independent
license to engage in the unlimited practice of allopathic medicine.
It is evident that the alternative therapies defined by R213-97
are limited in scope and do not constitute the unlimited practice
of allopathic medicine. Consequently, it can be argued that
the regulation is consistent with legislative intent and is,
therefore, valid.
2. Arguments against validity
The strongest arguments against
the validity of R213-97 originate in the legislative history
of A.B. 286. Standard rules of statutory construction permit
the use of legislative history to establish legislative intent
when a statute is ambiguous. The legislative history of A.B.
286 reveals that the Assembly Committee on Commerce deliberately
removed the terms "intravenous infusion, chelation therapy,
and pharmaceutical medicines" from the bill. This is consistent
with the notion that it was the intent of the Legislature that
homeopathic physicians were not to be authorized to engage in
these practices. It is well settled that "[a]dminstrative
regulations cannot contradict or conflict with the statute they
are intended to implement." Roberts v. State, 104 Nev.
at 37, 752 P.2d at 223. As the Attorney General argued, a regulation
"cannot restore a power that the Legislature specifically
took out of a piece of legislation." (A.G.O. 99-06.) Thus,
to the extent that R213-97 authorizes homeopathic physicians
to practice intravenous infusion and chelation, and to prescribe
some pharmaceutical preparations, it can be argued that it violates
legislative intent and is, necessarily, invalid.
It must be noted, however, that
some problems occur with this argument. First, the Nevada Supreme
Court has expressly proscribed the use of legislators' statements
of opinion as a means of determining legislative intent. "'[I]n
construing a statute we do not consider the motives or understands
of individuals who cast their votes in favor of it.. . . [Even
if] the legislator whose motives are proffered actually authored
the bill in controversy; no guarantee can issue that those who
supported this proposal shared his view of its compass.'"
A-NLV Cab Co. v. State Taxicab Authority, 108 Nev. 92, 95
(1992), quoting Cal. Teachers Ass'n
v. San Diego Com. College, 621 P.2d 856, 860 (Cal. 1981) (citations
and internal quotations omitted). "A legislator's statement
is entitled to consideration, however, when it is a reiteration
of legislative discussion and events leading to adoption of
proposed amendments, rather than merely an expression of personal
opinion." See also Khoury v. Maryland Casualty Co., 108
Nev. 1037, 1040 (1992). In this instance, however, even assuming
that the Legislators' recollections were entitled to consideration,
they appear to be offsetting. Members of the Assembly recall
that the three therapies were removed by amendment for the deliberate
purpose of excluding them from the scope of homeopathic practice.
Members of the Senate recall that the intent behind their removal
was merely to eliminate redundancy and that the eliminated terms
were available therapies already included within the other approved
therapies.
A second difficulty was referred
to earlier. It is not readily apparent that the authority to
engage in the unlimited practice of allopathic medicine that
may have been removed by elimination of the term "pharmaceutical
medicine" from the statute is the same as the limited authority
to prescribe some chemical substances that is granted by virtue
of the regulation's use of the term "pharmaceutical preparation."
This is especially so because the authority to prescribe these
latter substances is constrained by the requirement of medical
appropriateness in the context of a specific authorized alternative
therapy. In any event, it is undeniable that the two other statutory
terms eliminated by the Assembly Committee on Commerce---"intravenous
infusion" and "chelation therapy"--- are the
same as the two terms restored by the regulation. The two terms
are related. Chelation therapy is recognized in conventional
medical circles as a technique for treating victims of heavy
metal poisoning. The most common example, apparently, involves
miners whose blood and bones show unusually high concentrations
of lead. Certain drugs (chelating agents) with the chemical
property of binding to heavy metals at the molecular level are
introduced, commonly by means of intravenous infusion, into
the body of the miner. The heavy metals abandon their chemical
bonds with the body's tissues and fluids in favor of combining
with the chelating agents. When these chelating agents are subsequently
eliminated from the body, the heavy metals are eliminated as
well. Practitioners of alternative medicine contend that chelation
can be used to remove other harmful substances from the bodies
of patients. Apparently, the most common example of this alternative
practice is the treatment of arteriosclerosis by chelating the
harmful plaque build-up in arterial walls. The efficiency of
this treatment for its alternative purpose has not been demonstrated
to the satisfaction of the allopathic medical community. Nevertheless,
in 1998, the Medical Board refused to adopt a regulation that
would have prohibited any allopathically licensed physician,
including any dually-licensed homeopathic physician, from using
chelation therapy except to remove heavy metals from a patient's
body. (See "Nevada doctors battling," Las Vegas Review
Journal, December 3, 1997; "Continued use of alternative
medicine to treat hear bypass surgery OK'd," Las Vegas
Review Journal, January 30, 1998.) In any event, chelation therapy,
even when practiced alternatively, requires the use of allopathic
dosages of allopathic substances. Moreover, any allopathic physician,
including a dually-licensed homeopathic physician, may perform
chelation in its conventional or alternative mode. For this
reason, it would not be unreasonable for a court to find R213-97
invalid to the extent that it authorized a singly-licensed homeopathic
physician to perform chelation, especially by means of intravenous
infusion.
3. On balance
It is the opinion of this office
that when A.B. 286 and its legislative history are examined
as a whole, the legislative intent behind the bill was to extend
the scope of the licensed practice of homeopathic medicine and
to increase the power of the Homeopathic Board to regulate that
practice, but that it was not the intent to authorize singly-licensed
homeopathic physicians the unlimited right to practice allopathic
medicine in the same manner as allopathic physicians. More particularly,
the Legislature intended homeopathic physicians to enjoy expanded
authority to write prescriptions with regard to certain allopathic
medicines, but only to the extent required in practicing certain
enumerated alternative therapies. In general, the definitions
contained in the regulation of the Homeopathic Board, R213-97,
do not exceed the Board's statutory authority and are consistent
with legislative intent. We think it highly likely that a court
of competent jurisdiction, if asked, would agree. We believe,
however, that with respect to the definition of one alternative
therapy, orthomolecular medicine, particularly that branch of
it that concerns chelation or other forms of detoxification
by means of intravenous infusion, there is a significant question
whether that portion of the regulation is consistent with legislative
intent. Nevertheless, assuming that a court would grant the
regulation its presumption of validity, would take into consideration:
(1) that the Legislative Commission did not object to the regulation
on the grounds that it violated legislative intent; and (2)
that the Legislature as a whole, with knowledge of the existence
of the controversy over this provision, took no corrective action
during the 1999 session, we are inclined to believe that the
court would be more likely than not to uphold the validity of
this element of the regulation as well. In any event, we conclude
that such a court would not invalidate the regulation in its
entirety.
III. Conclusions
It is the opinion of this office
that the declaration of the invalidity of R213-97 contained
in Attorney General Opinion No. 99-06 is legally null. Only
a court of competent jurisdiction may invalidate a regulation
and until such a court does so, R213-97, having satisfied all
the procedural requirements of the Nevada Administrative Procedure
Act, remains in effect and must be presumed to be a valid regulation.
It is the further opinion of this
office that licensed homeopathic physicians may practice all
of the therapies defined in R213-97, including chelation therapy
and other forms of detoxification by means of intravenous infusion.
A reasonable interpretation of the statutes and regulations,
currently in effect, including R213-97, establishes that homeopathic
physicians possess the following authority to write prescriptions
by virtue of their homeopathic licenses:
1. When practicing traditional or
classical homeopathy, they may prescribe, dispense and administer
traditional homeopathic remedies as medically appropriate according
to the standards applicable to the homeopathic tradition. With
respect to allopathic medications, including controlled substances
or dangerous drugs, homeopathic physicians may write prescriptions
for a single pill of such substances, but only for the purpose
of diluting it and compounding it into a homeopathic preparation,
only if the allopathic drug is found in the Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia
and only if the resulting diluted dosage is in accordance with
dosages found in that pharmacopoeia.
2. When practicing one of the alternative
therapies expressly authorized by A.B. 286 and defined in R213-97,
homeopathic physicians may prescribe:
(a) Any controlled substance listed
in schedule I, II, III, IV or V as set forth in chapter 453
of NRS, so long as both administration and dosage are medically
appropriate according to the standards applicable to that alternative
therapy, except that a homeopathic physician may not prescribe
"narcotic drugs and opiates that are listed as schedule
II controlled substances pursuant to chapter 453 of NRS, except
as those substances may be described for use in the official
Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States." (R213-97.)
(b) Any dangerous drug that is defined
in chapter 454 of NRS so long as both administration and dosage
are medically appropriate according to the standards applicable
to that alternative therapy.
(c) Any other allopathic drug available
by prescription so long as both administration and dosage are
medically appropriate according to the standards applicable
to that alternative therapy.
Finally, it is the opinion of this
office that, in general, the definitions contained in the regulation
of the Homeopathic Board, R213-97, do not exceed the Board's
statutory authority and are consistent with legislative intent.
However, with respect to the definition of one alternative therapy,
orthomolecular medicine, particularly that branch of it that
concerns chelation or other forms of detoxification by means
of intravenous infusion, there is a significant question whether
the regulation is consistent with legislative intent. Nevertheless,
in light of the presumption of validity that accompanies every
regulation and taking into consideration that the Legislative
Commission did not object to the regulation and that the Legislature
took no corrective action during the 1999 session, we are inclined
to believe that a court of competent jurisdiction would be more
likely than not to find the portion of the regulation consistent
with legislative intent. In any event. we conclude that such
a court would not invalidate the regulation in its entirety.
If you have any further questions
regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact this
office.
Very truly yours,
Brenda J. Erdoes
Legislative Counsel
By___________________
William B. R. Daines
Deputy Legislative Counsel
By___________________
Jan K. Needham
Principal Deputy Legislative Counsel
WBDR:dtm
Ref No. 9907061127
__________________________________________
1. This definition also included
the use of "noninvasive electrodiagnosis," even though
it is unlikely that this represented part of "classical"
or traditional homeopathy.
2. Both osteopathic and allopathic
physicians are licensed and regulated by the State Board of
Medical examiners (Medical Board). Moreover, doctors osteopathy
have the same authority to prescribe allopathic prescription
drugs, controlled substances and dangerous drugs as do doctors
of medicine. For the remainder of this memo, therefore, when
speaking of the authority to write prescriptions, we will use
"allopathic" as inclusive of "osteopathic,"
except when it is necessary to distinguish between the two practices.
3. According to the 1991 edition
of the Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, sarcodes
are "homeopathic attenuations of wholesome organs, tissues,
or metabolic factors obtained from healthy specimens . . . prepared
according to homeopathic specifications [in which] the basic
substance is not altered and the FINAL PRODUCT is not adulterated
by any pathogen or other deleterious substance." The Attorney
General concluded, "No known allopathic drugs regularly
stocked by Nevada pharmacists would be 'sarcodes.'" (1993
Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 131, September 20, 1993.)
4. This clause also contained the
expansion of homeopathy to include the practice of "pharmaceutical
medicine," discussed above.
5. These two terms will be discussed
in greater detail in our response to your third question.
6. The revised regulation also eliminated
the term "local anesthetics" from the definition of
neural therapy on the ground that such substances were included
in the broader category of "pharmaceutical preparations."
7. Any person who is actually harmed
by the enforcement of a regulation or by a state officer acting
pursuant to the regulation may bring an action for damages against
the state or the officer, during the course of which the validity
of the regulation may be brought into issue and resolved by
the court. The Legislature's intent in enacting NRS 233B.110
was to permit the validity of regulations to be determined even
before they are enforced.
8. It could be argued that the Attorney
General is not asserting a power to declare a regulation invalid,
but is merely expressing that which is evident---a regulation
that exceeds its authorizing statute is void. Without disputing
the accuracy of this conclusion, it is the opinion of this office
that because chapter 233B of NRS provides detailed procedures
for establishing the validity of regulations, it cannot reasonably
be suggested that the Legislature intended chapter 233B of NRS
to be self-executing.
9. Although chapter 233B of NRS
gives the sole means for declaring a regulation invalid, NRS
233B.100 provides that "[a]ny regulation of any agency
is subject to amendment or suspension by the governor pursuant
to the provisions of NRS 416.060." This latter section,
however, becomes effective only "[u]pon the proclamation
of a water or energy emergency," and limits the amendment
or suspension power to the extent necessary to lessen the adverse
impact of that emergency.
10. To the extent that A.G.O. 99-06
is intended as a prediction of judicial behavior, rather than
an advocate's brief, it commits additional errors of omission
in that it fails to consider fundamental principles and rules
of statutory construction that a court would be bound to apply.
We discuss these principles and rules in response to your third
question.
11. This regulation does, however,
present a field for the application of the Attorney General's
principle. The alternative practices of "chelation therapy"
and "intravenous infusion" were deliberately amended
out of the statute by the Assembly Committee on Commerce, but
are restored by regulation as constituent parts of the practice
of orthomolecular therapy. We will discuss this aspect of the
regulation's validity subsequently.
12. Before July 1, 1999, the Legislative
Counsel's responsibilities concerning the regulatory process
were vested in the Director of the Legislative Counsel Bureau.
(See sections 43 to 49, inclusive, of chapter 463, Statutes
of Nevada 1999, at pages 2203-07.)
13. In any event, NRS 233B.0675
required the Legislature to nullify the regulation before the
30th day of the Legislative session. Even if the extension of
this deadline to the final day of the session that was enacted
in 1999 (section 1 of chapter 182, Statutes of Nevada 1999,
at page 903, effective May 20, 1999) could be made to apply
to apply to R213-97, that date has also long since passed.
14. It may be helpful to remind you
of the circumstances surrounding the Attorney General's Opinion
No. 98-01. In August, 1997, the Medical Board asserted that
A.B. 286 had granted it exclusive disciplinary power over all
licensed homeopaths who were also licensed by the Medical Board.
This drew a formal protest from Senator Townsend as a misinterpretation
of A.B. 286. (See letter from Senator Randolph J. Townsend to
Attorney General Frankie Sue Del Papa, November 4, 1997.) Shortly
thereafter, the Homeopathic Board requested an opinion from
the Attorney General as to the proper relationship between the
two boards, which was issued on January 13, 1998. (See Nev.
Op. Att'y Gen. 98-01 A.G.O. 98-01).) The primary focus of that
opinion concerned the obligations of a dually-licensed physician
when one board forbade a medical procedure that was condoned
by the other. The Attorney General concluded that the Legislature
had intended the Medical Board's disciplinary jurisdiction to
be exclusive. Thereafter, Senator O'Connell, you requested the
opinion of this office as to the soundness of A.G.O. 98-01.
We concluded that the Attorney General had overstated the powers
of the Medical Board and suggested, instead, that "the
Medical Board may not regulate the practices of a person who
is licensed to practice both allopathic and homeopathic medicine
while that person is actually practicing homeopathy within the
scope of chapter 630A of NRS." (Letter from Brenda J. Erdoes
and Eileen O'Grady to Senator Ann O'Connell, March 19, 1998.)
More generally, we suggested that the clear intent of the legislative
scheme had been to require that questions regarding dually-licensed
physicians could only be answered after establishing in which
capacity ---allopathic or homeopathic---the physician was practicing.
Note that this conclusion is consistent with the Attorney General's
earlier opinion that each license confers its own separate set
of powers and limitations, and that at any given moment a dually-licensed
physician is practicing one form of medicine or the other, and
not some hybrid or intermediate form. (See A.G.O. 93-21.) Thus,
both the Attorney General and the Legislative Counsel have endorsed
the proposition that a dually-licensed homeopathic physician
cannot use his allopathic license to prescribe allopathic drugs
in allopathic doses if his intention is to effect a homeopathic
treatment. The factual context for A.G.O. 93-21 concerned the
practice of chelation therapy, a form of medicine that we will
examine in more detail in response to your third question.
15. As suggested previously,
if A.G.O. 99-06 were considered in the nature of a brief submitted
to a court by the Attorney General as provided in NRS 233B.110,
we believe that the opinion would be insufficient to overcome
this presumption of validity.